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FUNDING THE MODERN STATE:
THE INTRODUCTION OF VALUE ADDED TAX IN FRANCE'
The period of the ‘great boom" was characterized in France as elsewhere in western 
Europe by a greatly increased role for the State in the national economy. Government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP rose steadily, the pattern of expenditure changed with 
increasing amounts being spent on new areas of activity such as health, economic services, 
housing and pensions, and the sources of revenue also changed, with greater reliance being 
placed on taxation to fund public expenditure.' Indeed, it is claimed that higher taxes were 
implicit in Europe’s postwar settlements and, contrary to growth theory, were actually 
conducive to economic growth.2 *
While considerable scholarly attention has been focused on the nature of government 
expenditure there has been much less interest in the sources of government revenue. With 
taxation generally seen as a "dry topic, second only to death in certainty and dreariness''5, 
the question of which taxes governments raised and what impact those taxes had on the 
economy, is not explored.4
In 1954-55 the French government reformed its fiscal system with the introduction of
'. 1 would like to thank both the British Academy and the Nuffield Foundation for their 
assistance in funding the research on which this paper is based.
Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. Oxford 1991.
Centre for Economic Policy Research, "Golden Years", in European Economic 
Perspectives No. 12. February 1997.
Cathie Jo Martin. "American business and the taxing State: Alliances for growth in the 
postwar period", in W. Elliot Brownlee (ed.). Funding the Modem American State, 1941- 
1995. Cambridge 1996.
*. This is no longer true of the United States, where interesting research into the history of 



























































































a new tax on value added to replace the existing taxes on production and sales. This change 
in the tax system, which was to increase its elasticity, was ultimately what permitted public 
expenditure to grow. In fact VAT was soon to become the mainstay of the entire fiscal 
system in France. It was subsequently adopted by the European Community as the common 
form of indirect taxation in all member states and by many other countries throughout the 
world. Indeed it has been claimed that in the history of taxation no other tax has swept the 
world as VAT has done over a thirty-year period.’ This makes the history of fiscal reform 
in France of international as well as national importance. Why should France have been the 
first country to introduce a tax which had been under discussion in Germany since the 1920s, 
and had been proposed by the American occupation authorities in postwar Japan only to be 
rejected by the Japanese parliament?
The most common explanation, and the one espoused by tax experts, is that VAT 
evolved through a process of continual refinement of the fiscal system.6 Having once in 
recent times overturned the entire structure of their regime's taxes, the French were more 
predisposed than most to question their fiscal system and to modify it, according to Carl 
Shoup, a leading American tax expert and the author of the Japanese reform proposal. Why 
the French should have accepted a system which relied considerably more on socially- 
regressive indirect taxes than on direct taxes has been attributed to cultural factors such as the
'. A. 1 ait. Value Added Tax. International Practice and Problems. IMF, Washington D.C. 
1988.
". Jean-Yves Nizet. Fiscalité, économie et politique. L'Impôt en France 1945-1990. Paris 
1991; and Carl S. Shoup. "Some distinguishing characteristics of the British, French and 





























































































low degree of civic consciousness of french people.1
Neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The fact that it took almost fifty years 
and two hundred parliamentary bills before the system of direct taxation inherited from the 
Revolution could be reformed, does not fit with Shoup's analysis. Indeed, it was the 
reluctance of the French people to accept changes in the system of taxation in the period 
between the French Revolution and the Second World War which most impressed French 
economic historians. Bouvier and Wolff explained this inertia in terms of the slow rate of 
change of the French social structures.® Similarly, the theory that Latin people do not pay 
their taxes has been disproved, not least by the experience of the post Second World War 
period in France.
Research based on detailed documentary evidence in France reveals a much more 
complicated picture. French fiscal reform stemmed from four separate but inter-related 
factors. The first was the rapid growth in government expenditure after the Second World 
War and a decline in the willingness of French people to lend money to the government. The 
second was that the tax system was seen to be profoundly inequitable, with reforms being a 
constant preoccupation of postwar governments. Thirdly, the tax system was considered to 
be inefficient and open to wide-scale fraud. And finally, the tax system was seen to favour 
and protect archaic and inefficient methods of production. However, not all these factors 
were of equal importance, as will now be explained.
\  ('. Webster and A Wildarsky, A History o f Taxation and Expenditure in the Western 
World, New York 1986.





























































































AN OVERVIEW OF FRENCH FISCAL HISTORY
In 1945 the fiscal burden (taxation as a proportion of national income) was light in France 
compared with Britain or the United States.
Table 1. Taxation as a Proportion of National Income
1938 1945
France 20.9 21.0
United States 25.6 34.1
Great Britain 24.1 40.1
Source: Ministère des Finances, Inventaire de la situation financière (Paris 1951).
The structure of taxation was also quite different. The French collected anything from 
a quarter to a third of their revenue from direct taxes, compared with over a half in Britain 
and three-quarters in the United States. And whereas the system of direct taxation had 
changed very little since its introduction by Joseph Caillaux during the First World War the 
system of indirect taxation had been modified constantly.
The system of direct taxation was based on a general income tax introduced in July 
1914 and on a number of scheduled taxes levied on distinct categories of income which in 
1917 replaced the four direct taxes inherited from the French Revolution.0 These schedules
\  The Quatre Vieilles introduced between 1790 and 1799 were:
- the land tax (contribution foncière), a tax of 16 per cent on income from lands and 
buildings:
-the personal income tax (contribution personnelle mobilière), a tax of 5 per cent on 
individual incomes:
-the so-called "patente" tax (patente), a proportional tax based on the rental value of 
business premises;
-the windows and doors tax (impôt des portes et fenêtres).
United States Treasury, "income Tax Laws of France", prepared in the office of the General 




























































































included tor the first time income from salaries and wages. Six different schedules were 
created: 1) income from property, 2) income from land, 3) agricultural profits, 4) industrial 
and commercial profits, 5) wages, salaries, pensions, annuities, and 6) profits of non­
commercial professions.
In addition there was a seventh category, which was not strictly speaking a schedule: 
that of income from certain types of securities and investments (impôt sur le revenu des 
valeurs mobilières). This tax had been introduced in 1872 and although it was clearly a tax 
on income it was collected by the Administration of Indirect Taxes. It was withheld at source 
by the bank or corporation.
The general income tax introduced in 1914 was superimposed on the scheduled taxes 
as well as on income from securities and investments. While the scheduled taxes were levied 
at a fiat rate in excess of a minimum the rate of the general income tax was graduated and 
increased from one per cent on the first 10,000 francs of taxable income to forty per cent on 
taxable income exceeding 1,320,000 francs.
While some of the scheduled taxes were based on actual income, others were assessed 
somewhat arbitrarily on the basis of estimated income according to what was known as the 
"forfait" system. Under this system, the taxpayer submitted a number of crude indicators 
such as volume of sales, sire of stocks, or number of employees, to the tax authorities, who 
then used a formula to estimate the income. At the outset in 1917 the tax on industrial and 
commercial profits was based on the forfait system. In 1920 this was replaced by assessment 
on the basis of actual net profits, but then changed again in 1934 to allow small firms which 
could not afford accurate book-keeping to choose either method.10
The tax on farmers’ incomes was based throughout the war and interwar period on a




























































































variant of the forfait system. Curiously there was no definition in French law of 
"agriculture", which gave the tax administration greater freedom in determining the type of 
activity subject to this tax, than was the case for industrial or commercial profits. The most 
common practice was for assessment of agricultural profits to be made on the basis of the 
rental value of the land (cadastral revenue), which was itself an estimated value for the 
purpose of the land register. The reason for assessing tax on the basis of estimated profits 
was because farmers were not required by law to keep books and accounts." At a time when 
the contribution to the war effort in terms of human lives of this section of the population was 
disproportionately high, there was little enthusiasm for adopting a punitive tax regime for 
farmers."
However, the consequences of this policy were that minimal revenue was raised from 
the agricultural sector. In 1941, the year that the system was reformed, the taxes paid by the 
agricultural sector were 0.5 per cent of those paid by wage and salary earners.” The central 
feature of the 1941 reform was that the tax on agricultural profits was to be determined by 
applying different coefficients in each département. These coefficients were calculated by 
comparing average profits per hectare with average rental value of the land. In homogeneous 
départements only one coefficient was applied, whereas in départements with distinct 
agricultural regions, several coefficients were used. This reform did increase the tax paid by 
the agricultural sector, although by 1945 it was still only about 6.6 per cent of that paid by
Ibid.
Jacques Wolff, "Fiscalité et développement en France entre 1919 et 19J9”, in J. Bouvier 
et J. Wolff (eds), Deux siècles de fiscalité française, XJXe-XXe siècles, Paris 1973.




























































































wage and salary earners.'4
Altogether, the burden of direct taxation was very unevenly and inequitably distributed 
across different groups, as can be seen from Table 2.




Wages and salaries: 9.6 10.4 43.0
Industrial and commercial profits: 27.8 26.5 32.6
Profits from non-commercial professions: 2.8 2.1 3.0
Agricultural profits: 0.2 0.3 3.0
Income from land: 17.8 11.2 4.4
Income from securities & investments: 41.8 49.5 14.0
Total 100 100 100
Source: Ministère des Finances, Inventaire de la situation financière (Paris, 1951).
In 1946 the share of total direct taxes paid by those on fixed incomes had more than 
quadrupled compared with pre-war, while that of securities and investments had declined by 
almost the same amount. Since the tax on income from securities and investment was also 
withheld at source15 the decline must have been due to a decline in distributed profits. 
However, there was no correspondingly large increase in the revenue from profits tax. Since 
tax rates were roughly comparable across schedules, the uneven returns indicated either a high 
level of fraud, or a greater ability to avoid paying taxes legally.
In comparison with the system of direct taxes, the system of indirect taxes had been 
changed many times since the First World War. In 1917 the French government, following 
the German example, had wanted to introduce a tax which would have a high yield and
ibid.




























































































follow the movement of prices. For this reason, it introduced a stamp duty on all payments. 
All retail trade was included. But the yield fell far short of expectations. In 1918 160 
million francs was raised, whereas 1150 million francs was predicted. The experiment was 
abandoned and the tax was replaced in 1920 by a turnover tax (taxe sur le chiffre d'affaires) 
at a rate of 2 per cent for all goods except luxuries, where the rate was higher, and for 
essentials, mainly foodstuffs, which were exempt.
The tax produced a high yield, but quickly came under attack for a number of 
different reasons. It was criticized for pushing up prices, and for giving the Ministry of 
Finance access for the first time to the accounts of industrialists and traders. More serious, 
perhaps, was the charge that the cascade tax pushed up the price of exports, since only the 
last stage of tax could be reclaimed when a product was exported. The export price therefore 
included all previous taxes. It was also seen to distort the structure of production by 
favouring large integrated concerns. The government composed of Radicals and Socialists 
which was elected in 1924 promised to abolish the tax, although it succeeded only in 
modifying it. In 1925 it created a single ad valorem tax collected at one or more stages of 
production on specified goods. Each year until 1934 the list was extended, but since the 
turnover tax was not abolished, the system became increasingly complex and entirely defeated 
the reforms of 1925.
In 1936 the Popular Front government did manage to abolish turnover taxes, replacing 
them with a single tax on production. The underlying principle of this tax was that 
manufacturing could be divided into two processes: production and distribution. The 
production tax of 6 per cent was imposed as a good passed from one sector to the other. 
When it was introduced in 1936 it was based on an annual statement made by the producer 




























































































responsibility tor paying the tax or delivering the product to another producer, in which case 
tax was suspended. Although in theory the new tax greatly simplified the system of indirect 
tax. in practice it introduced a number of new complications. Firstly, the definition of 
production was often contested. Secondly, depending on the number of producers involved 
in the production process and thus the number of times that tax was suspended, the system 
could be open to abuse.16
By exempting small artisans from the tax it gave them a great advantage over larger 
firms and encouraged the splitting of businesses into segments in order to take advantage of 
the exemption.17 As a result the production tax was soon to prove insufficiently elastic to 
meet the needs of rearmament, and in 1939 the cascade tax had to be re-imposed, initially 
under the name of an armaments tax, and later a transactions tax. The rate of the production 
tax was raised to 15.35 per cent in 1940. A local tax was introduced on retail trade in 1942 
at a rate of 0.25 per cent and finally a luxury tax was levied in 1943.18
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN FRANCE AFTER 1945
At first it seemed as if public expenditure excluding social security would follow a 
similar pattern after the Second World War to that after the First World War. In other 
words, after a period of expansion due to the needs of reconstruction, it would fall, but then 
stabilize at a level higher than the prewar level.
Indeed, expressed in terms of GDP, public expenditure was no higher after 1945 than
'6. Nizet, op. cit., p.35.
\  John F. Due, "Sales Taxation in Western Europe, Part 11", National Tax Journal vol. 
Vlll no. 3, September 1955.




























































































after 1918. However, after falling in 1949 it rose again in 1950 and continued to rise until 
1958. This was partly due to the American pressure on its NATO partners to increase their 
defence spending after the outbreak of the Korean War and partly due to the cost of France’s 
own colonial wars.
Table 3, Public Expenditure as a Proportion of GDP at Constant 1938 Prices
Year State Local Social Total
Authorities Security
1872 8.2 2.8 0 11.0
1912 8.8 3.8 0 12.6
1920 27.8 5.0 0 32.8
1929 13.6 5.1 0.1 18.8
1938 20.1 5.5 0.9 26.5
1947 29.0 3.7 8.1 40.8
1948 30.4 4.1 6.5 41.0
1949 27.0 4.7 6.6 38.3
1950 28.9 5.3 6.9 41.1
1951 27.0 5.2 6.8 41.0
1952 31.9 5.3 7.0 44.2
1953 34.8 5.9 7.9 48.6
1954 34.8 6.2 8.6 49.6
1960 29.1 6.8 10.5 46.4
























































































































Source: André and Delorme, op. cit., p.727.
However, this increase in defence expenditure, while not high by historical standards 
in France, did nonetheless raise problems for the French Treasury, since much of the new 
public expenditure after the war in civil investment and welfare had been financed by 
reducing the proportion of defence spending in the budget. It had also been financed by 
using the counterpart of Marshall Aid - a source which was due to expire in 1952. Whereas 
French governments had relied in the past and particularly in the nineteenth century on 
covering a large part of their expenditure through private loans'9, after 1945 this was no 
longer an option. The problem was that it took several years tor the French State to accept 
that it could no longer try to secure its legitimacy by raising money internally. The attempt
'9. On the eve of the First World War, the French State, it is claimed, was the most indebted 
in the world. D. F Schremmer, "Taxation and public finance: Britain, France and 
Germany", in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f 




























































































by Prime Minister Antoine Pinay to solve the budgetary problems caused by re-armament by 
issuing a loan in 1952 was to mark the end of this illusion.
PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL REFORM
It is somewhat surprising that taxation scarcely featured on the reform agenda for 
postwar France of the French Resistance. Even though the reforms demanded by it and 
written into the Charter of the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) called for a greatly 
enlarged role for the State in French economic life, no provision was made for ensuring that 
the State would be able to finance its activity in a non-inflationary way. Given the social 
diversity of the resistance groups, all that could be agreed was that those who had profited 
from collaboration should have their assets confiscated.20 Thus the laws of 18 October 1944 
and 6 January 1945 were designed solely to confiscate "illicit" profits and left intact the 
wealth made since 1940 and the structure of taxation. Some attempt to remedy this was made 
with the introduction of a national solidarity tax on 15 August 1945. This took the form of 
a levy on wealth as assessed on 4 June 1945 as well as a contribution from profits made 
between 1 January 1940 and 4 June 1945, calculated on a progressive scale from 3 to 20 per 
cent.21 The returns fell well below expectations and were even considered to have 
contributed to inflation, since firms were able to pass them on through higher prices to the 
consumer.22 As a result tax revenue covered only 45 per cent of government expenditure 
in 1945.
Of course, this deficit was due in part to the low level of economic activity and could
20. Nizet, op. cit.
21. Min. Fin. 1A 394. "L'évolution de la législation fiscale de juin 1940 à l’époque 
actuelle."




























































































be expected to shrink as the economy recovered from the war. Apart from the socialists who 
insisted that all normal public expenditure should be financed from taxation,” the 
expectation was that some, particularly the "exceptional" expenditure arising from the need 
to modernize the economy, could be raised through voluntary loans.24 However, given the 
increasingly inequitable distribution of the burden of direct taxation, as is clear from Table 
2, no government could resist for long the pressure to reform the fiscal system.
In 1946 the government responded to this pressure by setting up a special committee 
on tax reform, composed of representatives of the government, the trade unions, civil 
servants, tax officials, technicians and different categories of taxpayers. While it stimulated 
several proposals for fiscal reform due to the fact that almost everyone had a grievance, it 
was unable to produce a majority report.”
One of the earliest proposals for tax reform, and by far the most comprehensive, came 
from the Communist-dominated trade union, the Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT). 
Motivated by both the injustice and the inefficiency of the fiscal system, it called for a 
number of changes in both direct and indirect taxes and in the administration of the fiscal 
system itself. These included the replacement of the various income taxes by a single, 
uniform income tax, based on actual income rather than the 'forfait', an annual tax on wealth, 
the introduction of a tax on business in the form of a tax on value added to replace the 
existing multiplicity of taxes on sales or turnover, and the merging of the tax administrations *13
” , Journal Officiel. 1945. "Budget des services civils pour Texercice 1945", intervention by 
Jules Moch, 7/2/45.
,4. See Frances Lynch, Trance and the International Economy: from Vichy to the Treaty of 
Rome (London, 1997). Chapter 4.




























































































into a single one with greater powers of control."
It was the administrative reform which was in fact the least contentious. Under two 
decrees in March and April 1948 a single Tax Authority replaced the four separate divisions 
which had jealously guarded their independence since the French Revolution. These were: 
the bureau of direct taxes, the bureau on indirect taxes, the customs bureau and the bureau 
of registration and stamp taxes.27 This was to mean that taxation could be considered from 
a single perspective, thereby reducing some of the rigid distinctions between direct and 
indirect taxes. It was also designed to simplify the collection of taxes and thereby reduce the 
level of fraud.
However, the CGT’s proposal to replace the production tax and the transactions tax 
by a new tax on value added did provoke considerable criticism. The CGT argued 
that from the perspective of pure economic theory a tax on final consumption would 
have been preferable to a multi-stage tax on value added. In practice, though, the 
collection of a tax at a single stage called for a high rate which then encouraged the black 
market, as the luxury tax introduced in France in 1943 had demonstrated. On the other hand 
a multi-stage tax which was also cumulative, such as the transactions tax, was seen to 
discriminate unfairly against small specialist firms in favour of large firms which were 
vertically-integrated. One ment of the value-added tax was seen to be that it would expose 
fraud since declaration of the value of sales and purchases would have to be made by firms 
at different stages of production and distribution. Another was that it would furnish the State 
with a more accurate picture of what was happening in the economy. The CGI proposed a 21
26. Min. Fin. B28370. "CGT Projet de Réforme Fiscale", 25.4.47.
Mm. Fin. B51739. "Exposé du projet de réforme de la CGT”, 10.1.47.





























































































rate for VAT of 10 per cent across the hoard. The only exception envisaged was on exports 
if it proved necessary. Even then, only the exporter of the final product was to be 
reimbursed. It was estimated that the final price to the consumer would not be affected by 
the introduction of VAT although the structure of intermediate prices clearly would be.21
Many of these arguments won support within the fiscal reform committee. Maurice 
Laure, an 'inspeaeur des finances', criticized the complexity of the existing system which 
allowed different exemptions to apply to the transactions tax, the production tax and the local 
tax, and which often turned the production tax into a cumulative tax. Pierre Uri, from the 
Commissariai au Plan, positively welcomed the introduction of VAT if it were to be applied 
to the agricultural sector as well as to the products consumed by it. Not only would this 
increase public revenue, he argued, but it could promote the modernisation of agriculture by 
reducing the extent of home consumption.” However, the majority of the Committee on 
Tax Reform criticized the CGT’s proposal on a number of grounds. It was felt that it would 
not be practical to apply VAT to small firms which in most cases lacked proper accounting 
procedures, nor to abolish all exemptions. It was also argued that if only the final exporter 
were to be eligible for a tax rebate this would encourage the exportation of semi-finished 
goods, which would be harmful to the French economy as a whole. The defenders of the 
production tax argued that it had been set up precisely to reduce the number of firms liable 
to pay it, as well as to encourage exports. But by far the most serious criticism was levelled 
against the CGT's definition of value-added Since this included not only the difference in 
value between sales and purchases but also changes in the value of stocks, it was argued that
Mm. Fin. B 28370. Projet de réforme fiscale, CGT 25.4.47 




























































































this would effectively mean that profits were being taxed twice.30 As far as the CGT was 
concerned this was fully justified, since firms were able to reduce their liability to pay profits 
tax in the short term by accumulating stocks. In a period of rapidly rising prices, stockpiling 
served as a hedge against inflation whilst at the same time contributing to inflation. This 
expansion of stocks could also have explained the low tax returns on income from interest and 
securities, seen in Table 2.
Despite the failure to reach agreement on tax reform, the trend was for taxes to cover 
a larger proportion of government expenditure in 1946 and 1947. However, in 1948, despite 
the exceptional taxes levied by Finance Minister René Mayer in January 1948, this trend was 
reversed. Furthermore, while the government was counting on being able to use the 
counterpart of Marshall Aid to cover some of the deficit, the American Economic 
Cooperation Administration in France was to make the release of counterpart conditional on 
a reform of the French fiscal system.31 This condition enabled the government to win a 
derogation from the 1946 Constitution and introduce such a reform by decree.
THE 1948 FISCAL REFORM: AN ATTACK ON FRAUD
The underlying assumption of those who dratted the reform bill introduced by Finance 
Minister Maurice Petsche on 8 December 1948 was that the basic structure of the French 
fiscal system was sound, obviating the need for a radical reform.
30. B 28343. 20th meeting of the Committee on Tax Reform, 28 July 1947.




























































































fable 5 French budgets. 1945 - 19,57 fin thousand million francs)
Year Total Fiscal Tax Revenue
Expenditure Receipts as a proportion of expenditure
1945 523 238 45
1946 681 462 68
1947 914 685 75
1948 1591 1050 66
1949 2047 1487 73
1950 2380 1770 74
1951 2905 2203 76
1952 3623 2579 71
1953 3751 2814 75
1954 3840 2965 77
1955 4092 3102 76
1956 4767 3479 73
Source: INSEE, Le Mouvement Economique en France de 1944 à 1957 (Paris, 1958).
In September 1948 the Ministry of Finance had made some changes to the way in 
which the production tax was collected, simply in order to increase its immediate yield. This 
entailed replacing the 'suspension of tax’ provision (whereby the tax was paid only by the 
final producer) by a system of fractional payments. This meant that each manufacturer all 
along the line from raw material to finished commodity would pay a part of the tax.’2 
As a result of this change in indirect taxes, the focus of the fiscal reform proper of December 
1948 was on direct taxes. As Maurice Petsche explamed to the National Assembly, the 
objective of the fiscal reform was two-fold: to equalize the fiscal burden, and to simplify the 
legislation. The intended result was to reduce fraud and increase tax revenue. For the first 
time ever, a distinction was to be made between the income of private individuals and that 
of companies. In each case it was the total income from all sources which was to be taxed 
together rather than separately under the different schedules.




























































































The personal income tax consisted of a proportional income tax and a progressive 
surtax. The proportional income tax was a flat tax levied at 18 per cent on income from all 
sources with no deductions at the hase and calculated on the basis of a direct evaluation by 
the taxpayer. It was not applied to income from wages and salaries, while artisans, small 
businessmen and professionals continued to have the option of substituting the 'forfait' system 
for a personal assessment. The progressive surtax was then levied on top of the proportional 
income tax at nominal tax rates rising steeply from 10 to 60 per cent. Although the scale of 
the new surtax above the first 10 per cent was exactly the same as that of the general income 
tax which it replaced, in practice it favoured those on higher incomes, although the rise in 
prices disguised this bias.
The tax on corporate profits was levied on all business firms organized in the legal 
form of corporations, at a uniform rate of 24 per cent. Where the profits were distributed 
they were taxed again at 18 per cent under the proportional tax and possibly again under the 
progressive surtax.” The new corporation tax attracted particular criticism from the Left 
when the fiscal reform decree was debated in the National Assembly later that month. It was 
pointed out that whereas undistributed profits were to be taxed at 24 per cent, they would 
previously have been taxed under the 'bénéfices industriels et commerciaux' , often at 28 per 
cent. Distributed profits which were not put into reserves would be taxed at 18 per cent 
under the taxe proportioned instead of at 30 per cent under the tax on income from 
securities and investment.”
The tax reform was therefore not seen to have created a fairer system but simply to
Baum. op. cit., pp. 132-138.
” , Journal Officiel. 1948. 2 'séance du 21 décembre 1948. "Maxima des dépenses et voies 




























































































have favoured large companies and shareholders. However, judged by the two objectives of 
reducing fraud and increasing tax revenue, the fiscal reforms of December 1948 were 
considered to have been a success. It was calculated that between 1949 and 1951 receipts 
rose by 590,000 million francs, of which 340,000 million francs were due to an increase in 
prices and production and 250,000 million francs were due to an increase in tax rates and the 
reduction of fraud. Indeed, over the whole period between 1944 and 1951 the increase in 
fiscal receipts due to increased rates and reductions in fraud was greater than the contribution 
from the counterpart of Marshall Aid.”
Because the reforms introduced in January 1949 were designed to simplify 
administrative procedures rather than to correct any underlying inequity in the system, 
criticism of the system continued, and proposals for more fundamental reform were put 
forward. One proposal came from the Confédération française de travail chrétien (CFTC), 
the small Christian trade union. Arguing that while in principle direct tax on income was a 
more equitable form of taxation, in practice many direct taxes became indirect taxes because 
in a sellers’ market they were passed on in the form of higher prices. For this reason the 
CFTC advocated replacing almost all direct taxes, apart from those on the highest incomes, 
by a production tax levied on all consumer goods but at differential rates. The resulting 
revenue could then be redistributed to families and those on low incomes.*
In 1950 revenue from income tax as a proportion of total tax revenue was a mere 28 
per cent in France, compared with 65 per cent in Britain and 85 per cent in the United States. 
This was not due to significantly lower rates of income tax in France, since in fact the rates
” , Min. Fin. B 28357. Memo from P. Allix, 27 March 1951.





























































































were comparable across all three countries. What it was due to was a much narrower tax 
base in France on account of the large number of evasions or exemptions.
For many people the most shocking exemptions were those granted to the agricultural 
sector, in 1949, out of a theoretical tax revenue of 750,000 million francs agriculture paid 
a mere 70,000 million francs. The 1948 reforms had failed to alter the way in which the tax 
on agriculture was calculated. It was recognized that to base the tax on the actual income of 
farmers would not work, since the tax authorities simply did not have the resources to check 
the accuracy of the declarations. To get around this problem the CFTC proposed that 
‘forfaits’ should be calculated on an individual basis but this proved less popular than the 
alternative proposal that mixed farms should be taxed according to whether they were small, 
medium or large.’7
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THE ROAD TO VAT
The one event which was to have the most dramatic impact on the fiscal system and 
which was ultimately to be responsible for the adoption of VAT was the outbreak of the 
Korean War. Arguments about the inequity of the fiscal system paled into insignificance 
beside the American demands on France to increase its military spending. Had this been seen 
as a short-term problem, it would not have provoked the sort of fundamental debate which 
was to take place in France in the early 1950s. Had the American demands not come at a 
time when France was already heavily engaged in fighting a war in Indochina, the problem 
might not have appeared so serious. But as it was, the move to perhaps a permanently higher 
level of military expenditure combined with the termination of Marshall Aid forced the 
French government to explore new ways of raising revenue. Taxation was thus to be a major 
issue in the run-up to the legislative elections of 1951. So much so that the Director of the 
Budget. Roger Goetze, criticized the prominence given to it by most of the political parties. 
In Goetze’s view taxes could not be raised any further, while constant talk of fiscal reform 
simply encouraged fraud. As he saw it, the only way to face up to the budget deficit was to 
address those areas of expenditure where action was most urgent. This meant bringing the 
defence of Indochina into the international arena, and asking the United States to supply 
France, free of cost, the military hardware which was being produced in France as a result 
of the Korean War.”
The chief inspector of taxes, Pierre Allix, was equally negative about the possibility 
of raising the extra revenue required out of taxes. Were he to have increased direct taxes on 
both individuals and corporations, this would have been socially unjust, given the low 
standard of living of French workers, and would have jeopardized the attempt at that time to




























































































introduce collective bargaining in wages. Were he to have raised the tax on corporations 
alone, this would not have raised sufficient revenue. Were he to have adopted what might 
have seemed the most equitable solution, namely to levy the same percentage increase on both 
direct and indirect taxes, it would in fact have fallen more heavily on indirect taxes and 
resulted in higher prices. The other option was to levy a new tax on capital, but he 
considered that this would be more appropriate in dealing with a crisis of over-production 
rather than one caused by the needs of rearmament.” In fact it was the economic as 
opposed to the financial pressures arising from rearmament which were to prove decisive in 
the debate about tax reform.
At first sight it had seemed that French industry would be able to meet the increased 
demands arising from rearmament, without cutting back supply to the market. But the scope 
for expanding national production, judged to be 12 per cent given the existing capacity, was 
in fact limited to between six and seven per cent due to a number of bottlenecks. These 
included an inflexible labour supply; a shortage of housing, which prevented industrial 
regrouping or relocation which might have increased productivity; an underlying shortage of 
energy, particularly of coal; as well as supply bottlenecks of other raw materials and 
intermediate goods.
Even supposing that production could have been increased to meet the demands of 
rearmament, it was not certain that it would not have unfavourable repercussions on domestic 
prices and stability. Any increase in wages would raise the demand for consumer goods and, 
given the low standard of living of French workers, wages would have been spent in the most 
vulnerable and most heavily squeezed sectors of the economy, namely the textile and 
consumer goods industries. Such an increase in demand would have led those industries to




























































































invest and to increase the demand tor capital goods. The final result would have been an 
increase in prices and wages and a fall in the exchange rate.
The conclusion drawn by the Ministry of Finance was that, given the labour shortage, 
a policy based on deficit financing would not work. What was needed was a policy designed 
to improve labour productivity.* Not only would this lead to an increase in output but it 
would also produce higher fiscal returns with which to cover the additional expenditure on 
rearmament. This discovery of labour productivity by officials in France fitted well with the 
new emphasis on labour productivity of the American Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA). But whereas initially ECA’s exhortations had found most appeal among French 
employers, after the Korean War even the planners were shifting their focus away from 
improving the productivity of capital to improving that of labour.*'
In April 1952 an official report was published which for the first time argued strongly 
in favour of the adoption of VAT. This report was the work of a special commission on 
productivity and taxation which had been set up in January 1952. Its principal author, 
Maurice Laure, had been one of the few to argue the case for VAT in 1948. Since then he 
had been on a productivity mission to the United States to find out why the fiscal burden was 
so much lighter in the United States than in France. The answer lay, he claimed, in the 
higher levels of labour productivity in the United States. If labour productivity in France 
could be raised then tax receipts would rise and the overall fiscal burden would fall, he 
argued.* 40*2
40. Min. Fin. B 28357, Projet d’exposé des motifs d’ensemble aux éléments composant la 
loi de finances.
*'. Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan (Manchester, 1987), p. 161.




























































































Table 7 National Income and Tax Levy (in thousand million dollars)
National Income Levy of Taxes and Taxes as proportion
Social Security of national income
USA 1948 214 54.5 25.4
France 1949 81 5.8 32.2
Source: Min. Fin. 1A 394.
Thus, in addition to all the other criticisms of the production tax which had been 
voiced in 1948 a new one was heard - namely, that it impeded the investment necessary to 
raise labour productivity. This was because under the production tax the only expenditure 
which could be set against tax was what was incorporated physically into producUon. This 
meant that investment in all those factors which were seen to improve productivity such as 
research and development, energy, advertising, or capital equipment, were taxed twice. A 
further advantage was that if the fiscal system could be used to promote investment 
throughout the economy this would enable the government to cut its own spending on 
investment.
Publication of the report from the Commission on Productivity and Taxation coincided 
with the formation of the third government of the second legislature, this time led by Antoine 
Pinay. Pmay’s policy was based neither on trying to increase taxes nor on cutting public 
expenditure, but on encouraging hoarders of wealth to lend to the government under very 
favourable terms. His reaction to the report on taxation was to set up another commission 
on fiscal reform, named after its vice-chairman, Louis Loriot, President of the Finance 
Division of the Conseil d'Etm. Its remit was to report to the government on the ways in 
which the fiscal system could be simplified while at the same time improving the distribution 




























































































among politicians, planners, trade unions, chambers of commerce, the general confederation 
of the Middle Classes, the association of mayors and three independent experts. The general 
director of taxes, the general director of customs and indirect taxes and the director of public 
accounts, all participated, but in a consultative role.
The planners immediately widened the scope of the Commission to include as 
objectives of fiscal reform, in addition to financial stability and an equitable distribution of 
income, the growth of national income and of productivity and the expansion of trade. They 
argued that unlike the situation in Britain, where the government was able to use fiscal policy 
to fine-tune the economy, in France the government had so little control over taxes that it was 
constantly trying to raise revenue without being in a position to consider its economic impact. 
This resulted in a particularly inequitable distribution of income in France. According to 
studies undertaken by the planners, wage-earners who constituted over 60 per cent of the 
active population accounted for less than 45 per cent of the national income. The average 
income of a wage-earner, as a proportion of the average national income, was lower in 
France than in any European country studied by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe. Furthermore, the purchasing power of a wage-earner in France, in terms of the 
prices of certain essential goods, was lower than in other countries. Of course, as the 
planners pointed out, the UN studies took no account of social welfare benefits. Nonetheless 
the pressure to increase wages was seen to be one of the main factors in the high rate of 
inflation in France since 1945.
The fiscal system was not the only factor to blame for this situation. Other reasons 
for inflation in France were the restrictions on competition, both internal and external, and 
the monopoly profits which such protection generated. Among the consequences of the poor 




























































































wage-earners paid a disproportionately large amount of the direct taxes. While the planners 
recognized that it was technically feasible to devise a system of indirect taxation which would 
meet the same objectives of social justice as one based on direct taxes, they felt that it was 
very much more difficult. It would call for a system of multiple tax rates with some goods 
carrying no tax at all and some a very heavy burden, as in Britain. The French experience 
of having a luxury tax had been short-lived on account of the very high level of fraud. In 
their view, the tax system should promote the growth of national income and productivity, 
or at least not impede it. They criticized in this respect the production tax exemptions given 
to artisans and cooperatives. A further reason for reforming the tax system was to promote 
foreign trade. Pressure to reduce tariffs at both an international and a European level within 
the fixed exchange rate system set up at Bretton Woods would leave governments with no 
means to correct price distortions arising form their fiscal systems, they argued. In a 
perfectly functioning international economy or common market, goods which were exported 
would be exempted from domestic taxes, while imports would be subject to the same taxes 
as domestic products. In reality, and in particular in those countries with a cascade system 
of indirect taxes, imports had an unfair advantage over domestic products since they were 
taxed once, whereas domestic products were taxed several times. Since the French 
production tax was only partially cumulative, France was not the worst affected in this 
respect.
The specific reforms recommended by the planners were firstly the abolition of the 
transactions tax, since it simply added an extra layer of complication to those sectors subject 
to the production tax. In other sectors it provoked an intolerable degree of fraud with 
disastrous economic consequences. As far as external trade was concerned it had all the 




























































































disadvantages ot the cascade system - in terms of the inaccuracies of rebates - without any 
of the supposed advantages in the form of producing greater economic rationalization. The 
most effective way of reducing taxes was not by reducing costs or shortening circuits, but by 
eliminating a transaction. What a cumulative tax did was simply favour financial integration 
without promoting real economies.
With the elimination of the transactions tax reform could be concentrated on the 
production tax where the degree of fraud was in any case the lowest. In principle it was not 
a cumulative tax and had the further advantage of not promoting business regroupings to 
bring purchases and sales together, but in practice it was partially cumulative. This was due 
to the fact that only those materials which were physically incorporated in the final product 
or which disappeared entirely, were exempt from tax. Thus for all those supplies and 
services which went under the heading of general costs, the tax was in fact partially 
cumulative. On the other hand, tax paid on goods of rapid consumption was subsequently 
deductible, which gave rise to all sorts of legal cases of definition. To get around this it was 
proposed to tax the difference in value between purchases and sales at each stage of 
production and distribution so that the sum of these differences was equal to the final value 
of the product.
Another problem with the production tax concerned the definition of production. To 
avoid the legal wrangle which this produced, it was recommended that VAT be levied on all 
purchases of goods and services outside the firm whatever their form. This still left a number 
of issues to be resolved - including how to tax investment, stocks, services, trade, exports and 
the system ot exemptions.
The treatment of investment was seen to be particularly difficult. Under the existing 




























































































This was based on GNP being equal to consumption and investment. But even this involved 
some double accounting in the sense that it included the value of investment goods when 
produced and their depreciated value when incorporated into the final selling price. Since 
investment was in fact taxed twice in this way, it was only viable if the returns were greater 
than about 18 per cent, which meant that the improvements in productivity had to be 
considerable for such investment to be undertaken. It was suggested that this discrimination 
against investment could be avoided if the basis for taxation were to become the net national 
product, i.e. prices net of depreciation. This then raised the delicate question of how to 
calculate depreciation in the taxes on dividends. It was for this reason that the CGP 
supported the recommendation made by the Commission on Productivity and Taxation. This 
was to avoid the discriminatory taxation of investment by includmg investment goods and 
building works with all the other purchases which were tax deductible - even if carried out 
by the firm itself. As far as the treatment of stocks was concerned, no change from the 
system under the production tax was envisaged. This meant that no tax was paid until the 
stocks were sold.
The taxation of services was to be greatly simplified. In place of the taxe sur les 
prestations de services, the transactions tax and the local tax, a single tax on value added was 
to be imposed. As far as exports were concerned, the planners felt that tax rebates were not 
always necessary, particularly for products which faced little or no competition outside 
France. On the other hand, for those exports which faced stiff competition and which were 
subject to indirect taxes in the importing country, tax rebates were to be allowed. One of the 
perceived advantages of VAT was that it would simplify this system. Those firms which 
produced almost exclusively for the export market might actually be entitled to a tax rebate 




























































































Apart from the Confédération Générale de l'Agriculture (CGA) which was opposed 
to any change in the fiscal system, many of the interest groups consulted by the Loriot 
Commission favoured the adoption of VAT. But where they disagreed was over whether 
VAT should apply to production alone or extend to sales. While it was recognized that most 
fraud occurred at the distribution stage, it was seen by the wholesale and retail trade as a 
wholly unacceptable burden to place on the thousands of small firms which characterized this 
sector. On the other hand not to apply VAT to sales would have greatly reduced the benefits. 
It would also have meant setting a much higher rate.
The CGT, which had favoured the adoption of VAT in 1947, was most critical of the 
proposal to exempt new investment from it on the grounds that this contravened the principle 
of fiscal neutrality. In its view, it was preferable for the government to steer the economy 
through the use of subsidies rather than use the fiscal system.'15
Most industrialists, when canvassed by the employers' association, the CNPF, 
preferred a system of accelerated amortisation to reduce the cost of investment rather than the 
proposal to exempt new investment from tax." What this meant in effect was that they 
preferred to maximise their profits through savings on tax rather than by undertaking new 
investment. Interestingly, the car firm Renault did not share this view and made its support 
for VAT and for the deductibility of investment quite clear.45
Similarly, the steel partnership SOLLAC, which had been formed in 1948, argued that 
the transactions tax, which was levied each time steel products were passed from one steel 
firm in the partnership to another, undermined the modernisation of steel production which
45. Meeting of the Conseil Economique, 26 March 1953.
", Min. Fin. B 28370. Note, 24 April 1952.




























































































their partnership had been designed to promote. This made SOLLAC a strong supporter of 
the replacement of both the production tax and the transactions tax by VAT."
Perhaps the most bizarre proposal for fiscal reform which was submitted to the Lonot 
Commission was that of the industrialist Eugène Schueller. His proposed reform consisted 
of abolishing all existing taxes, except for customs duties and the tax on alcohol, and 
replacing them with a single tax on energy fixed at different rates for different sources of 
energy. According to Schueller, such a tax would reduce the fiscal burden by 50 per cent 
because it would reduce fraud, and encourage tax dodgers to convert their hoards of gold into 
loans to the government. As a result of the reduction in taxes prices would fall by 20 per 
cent, enabling production to rise by 30 per cent and income by 50 per cent. The simplicity 
of the system would release people from the burden of taxation and the intrusion of tax 
inspectors, he claimed.
Because of the popularity of the proposal it was examined by both the Loriot 
Commission and the Conseil Economique, both of which quickly demolished Schueller’s 
arguments. Briefly, it was argued that there was no evidence that capital was hoarded only 
to escape tax. In the unlikely event that it was lent to the government, an increase in 
government debt was considered undesirable since it would increase the need for taxes to 
service it. Furthermore, the suppression of fraud would not lead to a reduction of the fiscal 
burden but simply its redistribution. Another criticism was that the French economy did not 
have the capacity to enable production to rise by 30 per cent, in fact the only valid claim 
was considered to be the simplicity of the proposed tax reform. But even then, experience 
had shown that simple systems quickly became very complicated as demands for exceptional
Min. Fin. Z 157. "Les obstacles d’ordre fiscal à la modernisation de l’industrie 




























































































treatment were made. It was also clear that in taxing the main forms of energy, coal, 
electricity, gas and oil, incentives would be given to develop alternative forms of energy from 
water, wood or alcohol. It would give foreign suppliers of energy considerable control over 
French finances, would make the tax revenue very volatile, discourage mechanisation, and 
favour the rich. Indeed, the list of disadvantages was considered to be very long."
When it was finally submitted to the government the Loriot report recommended the 
adoption of VAT in both production and distribution with exemptions of 100 per cent for 
investment, energy and services. Pinay reduced these exemptions to 50 per cent before 
submitting it to the finance committee of the National Assembly. Even then the finance 
committee criticized the reform bill not for failing to address the central issues of promoting 
investment and productivity, but for promoting them too much. As a result it feared that the 
reforms would be inflationary, would do nothing to reduce the weight of indirect taxes and 
little to reform direct taxes.4* It felt that the proposed VAT retained much of the complexity 
of the production tax and merely tinkered with the existing system rather than reforming it.
As a result of these criticisms Pinay’s government failed to get its fiscal reform 
through the National Assembly in December 1952. Francis Leenhardt, a socialist, argued 
that one of the mam reasons for the failure was because the government ignored the injustice 
of its proposal. In trying to raise 58 per cent of its revenue from indirect taxes and 31 per 
cent from direct taxes, the burden of taxation would fall disproportionately on the poor." *47
41. Min. Fin. Z 812, "Observation sur le projet de M.E. Schueller tendant à l’institution de 
l’impôt sur l’énergie".
Ministère des Finances, "La Taxation de l’Energie", Statistiques et Etudes Financières, no.
47, November 1952.
**. Journal Officiel, Séance du 4 décembre 1952.




























































































Leenhardt argued that greater justice should be brought to the French fiscal system by 
reversing the existing weight of direct and indirect taxes. This could be done, he claimed, 
by excluding the retail sector from VAT. Such a restriction would have the further advantage 
ot facilitating the control of VAT.*
The Mayer government which replaced that of Pinay proposed a number of tax 
"improvements" which were even more limited than its predecessor’s, and were not 
surprisingly also rejected by the Finance Committee of the National Assembly.* 51 *
The tax reform bill which was finally to become law on 10 April 1954 was the 
combined effort of the Laniel government and the Finance Committee of the National 
Assembly. A decree of 30 September 1953 allowed provisionally the deduction of half of 
the production tax due on investment goods purchased by a firm.55 The law of 10 April 
1954 which finally replaced the production tax by VA T allowed the deduction of 100 per cent 
of VAT on investment goods. The new rate of VAT was set higher than the rate of the 
production tax to allow for this exemption, and the rate of corporation tax was increased from 
34 to 36 per cent. The following year VAT was extended to cover the wholesale trade and 
the transactions tax was abolished.”
Conclusion
Although tax reform was a popular demand in France in the years following the
Min. Fin. Z 807, "Projet de réponse à l'amendement de M. Leenhardt", mars 1954.
51. W. Baum. op. cit., p. 162.
” . Min. Fin. B 28379. "Projet de loi portant réforme fiscale renvoyé à la Commission des
Finances", 13 November 1953.




























































































Second World War and advocated by almost every group in society with the exception of the 
farmers, there was little agreement over the form which it should take. Under pressure from 
the American Economic Cooperation Administration to reform the fiscal system, the French 
government opted for administrative simplification rather than fundamental reform in the 
legislation introduced by decree in December 1948. It was the increase in defence spending 
occasioned by the wars in Indochina and Korea, combined with the ending of Marshall Aid. 
which led to a more fundamental review of the French fiscal structure. In the fiscal reform 
commission set up by the Pinay government in April 1952 it was the views of the French 
planners which were to prevail. The planners recommended the substitution of both the 
production tax and the transactions tax by a new tax on value added (VAT) with the full 
exemption of investment from VAT. The perceived advantages of VAT were that it would 
stimulate investment, while taking the cost of much investment out of the central budget, 
promote trade and competitiveness, and reduce fraud. The cost of these changes was to be 
covered by setting the rate of VAT higher than the existing production tax and increasing the 
rate of the corporation tax. Criticized by the socialists for increasing the weight of indirect 
taxes in the French fiscal system, VAT was initially restricted to the production sector, in 
1955 it was extended to cover wholesale trade, but it was not until 1968 that it was finally 
extended to the retail sector where it had long been acknowledged that most fraud took place.
The adoption of VAT was significant in that it substituted a highly elastic tax tor two 
taxes which, taken together, incorporated the worst features of the cascade system without 
offering any of its advantages. However, the adoption of VAT was not intended as a means 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636 
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it 
http://www.iue.it/
From N am e...................................................................
Address................................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99






































































































Working Papers in History
Published since 1995
HEC No. 95/1 
Albert CARRERAS/Andrea 
GIUNTINl/Michèle MERGER (eds) 
European Networks/Réseaux européens 





XIX and XX Centuries Transport 
History. Current Trends and New 
Problems *
HEC No. 96/1 
Albert CARRERAS/Elena CEFIS 




Luis Julio TASCÔN FERNÂNDEZ 
Productividad del trabajo durante el 
declive de la mineria del carbén Europea 
El modelo de la Huilera Vasco-Leonesa, 
1933-1993
HEC No. 97/1 
Sylvain P1RON
Nicolas Oresme: violence, langage et 
raison politique
HEC No. 97/2 
Frances M.B. LYNCH 
Funding the Modem State: The Introduc­
tion of Value Added Tax in France
'out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
*\)I*0p£o
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
